Beyond Settler Time: Deferring Juridical Time

tags

LAW 328 Green Legal Theory

cf Glissant's opacity, thinking of a kind of national privacy for Indigenous peoples.

Notes

insistence that Native people be recognized as contemporary or modern

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refusal to pursue non-native recognition

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degree to which modes of governance officially recognized by the United States as sovereignty can express forms of temporality that differ from dominant Euramerican frames of reference.

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potential value of provisionally suspending the question of how temporal sovereignty, as I’ve described it, could or should be operationalized

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To what extent, then, in the context of ongoing settler colonialism, should the juridical apparatus of Native governance be taken as expressive of the contours and dynamics of peoplehood

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juridical time can be understood as referring to the temporal dynamics at play in performing modes of governance understood by settler institutions as such

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conventional periodicities

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foreshortened timescale in regular decision making

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Indigenous “difference” divorced from Native peoples’ right to determine for themselves how they could or should operate as polities

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limits of refusal as a political strategy? Repudiating state recognition entirely can produce conditions in which Native peoples play no substantive role in the ways they are narrated within settler institutions.

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“We need to be able to speak and write convincingly in indigenous terms and be able to change how these arguments are used in the institutions of the state.”

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“Living, primary, feeling citizenships may not be institutionally recognized, but are socially and politically recognized in the everyday life of the community.”

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“culture is good as individual/community therapeutic practice but unimaginable as relational practices that inform govern- ments, ways of living in places.”

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range of terms that seek to indicate aspects of what might constitute self-determination, many of which do not seem to pertain to government as such.

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the definition of self-determination in these fairly broad terms works to forestall a process of culturalization through which vast swaths of Indigenous world making can be deemed not properly political

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sketch possibilities for addressing Indigenous thought, feeling, remembrance, and political imagination that do not fit within dominant settler accounts of time and that may be occluded by the call to understand Native people(s) as inherently occupying a shared time with non-natives.

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U.S. Indian policy can be understood as seeking to engender such a relation to forms of state-sanctioned tribal sovereignty, calling on Native people to invest in modes of settler-constrained and settler-regulated governance that can actively impede efforts to pursue broader forms of self-determination.

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queer commitment to the errant

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“Things seem ‘straight’ . . . ​when they are ‘in line,’ which means when they are aligned with other lines,”

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“queer commitment” is one that does not “presume that lives have to follow certain lines in order to count as lives, rather than being a commitment to a line of deviation.”

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To speak of Indigenous orientations suggests processes of being and becoming that emerge out of everyday life.

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