Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism

tags
Glyn Cashwell Frank Pasquale Prediction

Notes

We don’t know what’s going on in a judge’s head; it’s a black box, too

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explain why the decision was made

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policy considerations motivating judgments

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frank recognition of judges as political actors

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predict how judges will decide cases, how individual judges will vote, and how to optimize submissions and arguments

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one more tool deployed by richer litigants to gain advantages over poorer ones

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human behavior can change dramatically in a short period of time. Therefore, one should always be cautious when applying automated methods in the human context

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predictions of outcomes on the assumption that there is enough similarity between (at least) certain chunks of the text of published judgments and applications lodged with the Court and/or briefs submitted by parties

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As any student of statistics knows, if one tests enough data sets against one another, spurious correlations will emerge

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it is a foundational principle of both administrative and evidence law that irrelevant factors should not factor into a decision

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predictive tools are, at present, largely irrelevant to debates in jurisprudence

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Efficiency simpliciter is not an adequate rationale for modeling predictions of judicial behavior

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